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S e c u l a r i s m
AB DO U  F I L A L I - AN S A R Y
The ÔIslam and secularismÕ debate began a century ago
and does not seem to have progressed. Prevailing atti-
tudes, both ÔproÕ and ÔconÕ, are apparently locked in a
stalemate and an endless Ôwar of positionsÕ. Why are the
actors of different trends restating more or less the
same formulations on this issue? Is it possible to find a
likely interpretation for such a phenomenon?
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C o n t e m p o r a r y
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M u s l i m s 1
The Misunderstanding
a b o u t S e c u l a r i s m
The issue of secularism is addressed in dif-
ferent ways, depending on whether the con-
text is Muslim or Christian. In the latter case, it
is treated as a process, i.e. a set of historical
changes supposed to have affected the regu-
lation of the social and political order, and to
have permeated the prevailing conceptions
(or worldviews) within society. When the con-
text is ÔIslamicÕ, a clear opposition is posited at
the very beginning between ÔSecularismÕ and
ÔIslamÕ, taken as broad and substantive cate-
gories, which are supposed to refer to two
separate and irreducible realms of meaning.
The question asked in the first case seems to
concern Ôhow secularization happened in some
European societies at some time, and how it
influenced their functioning, and the domi-
nant attitudes of their membersÕ. In the other
case, however, the question is most often: ÔIs
Islam compatible with secularism?Õ The dis-
cussion is therefore drawn to conceptual, the-
oretical aspects: from the outset it adopts an
approach based on the manipulation of broad
concepts and discoveries, at one stage or
another. It is led to, and often locked in, a kind
of a p o r i a. Very few studies address the histori-
cal aspects of secularization within societies of
M u s l i m s ,2 i.e. ask how it affected the life and
views of Muslims, or attempt to describe what
a c t u a l l y happened since the category was dis-
covered and the changes were experienced by
Muslims. Therefore, an ideological bias seems
to dominate the debate in this field.
The few studies which concentrated on the
historical changes within societies of Muslims
since the 18th century point to the fact that,
although secularization as an ideology (i.e.
what the French call l a  c i s m e) was received
from outside, a real, observable ÔsecularizingÕ
process began much earlier. This process was
indeed a reaction to the perceived European
advance and menace. The need for deep
reform, and the actions taken in order to set a
new organization of state and society based
on rational criteria rather than religious tradi-
tions, stemmed from the perceived weakness
of Muslim polities and from internal drive to
overcome this situation. The irruption of the
European-originating ideology of secularism,
and its imposition on societies of Muslims
through the erection of modern nation-states,
interrupted the evolution of the initial,
ÔendogenousÕ secularizing process.
Whichever credit is given to these concep-
tions, and assuming that secularization (the
ÔrealÕ and durable phenomenon) was brought
into societies of Muslims from outside, i.e.
from an alien culture, it has stirred waves of
changes and numerous reactions which
deeply influenced the regulation of the social
and political order and gave birth to an
intense and continuous debate within these
societies. On one hand it is remarkable that,
since the distinction between the ÔsecularÕ and
the ÔregularÕ had no equivalent in Arabic, the
word chosen initially for secularism was
d a h r i y i n, a Qur'anic term for atheists.3 A l-
though it was replaced later by l a d i n i y y i n, the
semantic choices which were made convey a
strong assimilation between secularism and
atheism, or at least an opposition to, and reac-
tion against, religion. Even the term ci l m a n i
(this-worldly) which was introduced at a later
stage and which prevails to this day, conveys
the impression of rejection of the fundamen-
tal base of religion, i.e. the idea of transcen-
dence. In all cases, secularism was understood
as an alternative to religion, not as an alterna-
tive way of ordering society and of conceiving
the world. The majority of Muslims thought
that secularization imposed abandoning alto-
gether their religious faith, their traditions,
their values, etc. Secularization was equated
to a complete negation of the self, to a total
rejection of all the views, wisdom and prac-
tices inherited from the ancestors, and, above
all, it was perceived as an alien phenomenon,
introduced into societies of Muslims by those
who were the Ôhistorical enemiesÕ, crusaders of
yesterday and colonizers of the day. Then, as
still now, it was perceived in the fullest sense
of the word, as a l i e n a t i o n. Hence, the turn
taken by the debate in the public arena, with
the small exception of some academic circles.4
Secularists found themselves, except during
some short intervals, (as, for example, when
nationalism dominated) on the defensive.
Their enthusiastic and vibrant apologies of
rationalism, progress, development, freedom,
democracy, etc., as by-products of secularism,
were often successfully faced by accusations
from their opponents of unbelief, disrespect
for the ÔauthenticÕ values of society and some-
times, implicitly, if not openly, of treason.
Secularism vs. Secularization
The consequence of this evolution may be
described as boldly paradoxical in a double
sense. On one hand, one cannot avoid deep
surprise at the fact that Islam, which potential-
ly has less to oppose secularist worldviews and
ideals, would come to be seen as the most
resistant to secularism. As E. Gellner says: ÔThe
high culture of Islam is endowed with a num-
ber of features Ð unitarianism, a rule-ethic,
individualism, scripturalism, puritanism, an
egalitarian aversion to mediation and hierar-
chy, a fairly small load of magic Ð that are con-
gruent, presumably, with requirements of
modernity or modernisation.Õ 5
Of course, one cannot push aside the wide-
spread argumentation linking the success of
secularization within European societies to
specific features of Christianity, i. e. the rela-
tionship it establishes between the sacred and
the profane, between God and Caesar. Howev-
er, when one considers the long and painful
process through which the changes were
achieved and the secular order implemented,
one can only question the accuracy of this for-
mulation and wonder whether it is rather a
late justification rather than a real under-
s t a n d i n g .
On the other hand, it is easy to observe that
secularization has found its way to Muslim
societies, and has deeply and irreversibly p e r-
meated their ordering and the prevailing con-
ceptions within them. In almost all countries
belonging to the ÔMuslim worldÕ, positive law
and state regulations have replaced traditions
and rules drawn from religion or linked to its
tenets, with the exception of personal status
and family law, which remains the last resort
for conservation, or maintenance, of the ÔIslam-
icÕ identity. At the same time, the prevailing
worldviews are strongly permeated by con-
ceptions and attitudes linked to modern sci-
ence and ideologies. A real Ôdisenchantment o f
the worldÕ has made its way to the most dis-
seminated conceptions, even if authors as
famous as E. Gellner interpret the change as a
mere replacement of ÔlowÕ or ÔpopularÕ by
ÔhighÕ Islam.6 In fact, ideas of determinism,
modern expectations, and belief in continuous
progress have by and large replaced the tradi-
tional attitudes based on resignation and
belief in static or cyclical time and in mysteri-
ous forces.
The resulting situation is therefore marked
by strong contradictions: although s e c u l a r i z a-
t i o n has, in a way, happened (or at least
achieved many of its effects), secularism i s
seemingly rejected by the majority of the pop-
ulation. The call for implementation of the
s h a ri ca, which constitutes the main slogan of
fundamentalist movements, shows how con-
servatives feel the disruption of the traditional
order and its drifting from what they consider
to be the religious norms.
It was Ali Abderraziq (1888-1966) who, in the
mid-twenties, proposed what may be the best
approach to bring to a match the prevailing
conceptions and the actual situation within
societies of Muslims. His main idea, which he
exposed in his famous essay, Al-Islam wa Usul
al-Hukm (Islam and the Foundations of Political
P o w e r. Cairo, 1925), was to introduce a clear
distinction between Islam as a complex of
beliefs, moral norms and rituals, which can be
traced to sacred texts (first ÔmeaningÕ), and
Islam as the history of a community who
attempted to live up to its beliefs and to imple-
ment the morality and perform the rituals
which stem from them (second ÔmeaningÕ). The
community has chosen, for particular historical
reasons, to live its faith in a particular way, i.e.
through the creation of a polity designed to
prolong the sacred community of the Prophet.
However, this is not the only way to live the
faith and to implement its ethical principles.
The real, and most important turn in the histo-
ry of Muslims is not, as is widely believed, the
end of the Ôrightly-guided caliphateÕ (A l - K h i l a f a
a r - R a c h i d a), but rather the death of the
Prophet, which signalled the end of a sacred
community and the creation of a ÔcaliphateÕ
intended to continue his action. The caliphate,
even in its early phases, is Islamic only by
name. No such political system could legiti-
mately prevail, since nothing in the sacred cor-
pus (i. e. Islam in the first meaning) allows a
claim of this sort.
The reasons for an Impasse
The ideas of Ali Abderraziq were strongly
opposed. He was finally silenced, as were other
creative thinkers before and after him. In his
case, this did not happen as a consequence of
popular unrest or of pressure from massive
social movements. The ÔmassesÕ seemed to be
rather sympathetic to his ideas, as they were
perceived at that time as an open rebuke of
despotism. However, although he had a num-
ber of followers in the subsequent years, espe-
cially in the academia, the direction he
explored remained neglected.
Thus one may nowadays wonder whether
the impasse of societies of Muslims is due to
the continuous presence of small groups of
determined activists who, in the absence of
centralized religious authorities, exert a
strong censorship on public discourses and
blackmail political authorities. The recent
events in Iran offer a strong case for this inter-
pretation: although the majority of the popu-
lation has shown a clear option for liberal atti-
tudes (through the election of Mohamed
Khatami), a small group succeeds in blocking
the way to any real and durable progress in
this direction. '
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